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Influenced by numerous political miracles
around 1989, the idea came up to start from a ze-
ro point and to draw up a new "architecture of Eu-
rope". Both politicians and political scientists were
guilty of a great deal ofhybris, thinking that politi-
cal emotions, aspirations and hatred would stand
still, waiting for the new design to came from the
drawing boards. In practice, it nearly always hap-
pens that events unfold in unexpected ways, and the
role of governments consist in reacting to them.
The collapse of the old regimes in Eastern
Europe of their military and economic organizations
and the emergence of democratic forces came as sur-
prises to most of even the best informed minds. In-
stead of drawing up a new architecture on clean pages,
one had to react to the quickly unfolding events in
Central and Eastern Europe.
The reactions were reasonably quick. In a
short period after the fall of the Berlin wall, NATO
declared to the countries in the area, that "we are
no longer adversaries". From this new point of
departure, NATO established the North Atlantic
Consultative Council (NACC) and then -in Janu-
ary 1994 - opened up for new members and estab-
lished Partnership for Peace (PfP). Especially the
latter soon became an operative reality and now
has more than 40 participants.
In parallel with this came the eruption of
hostilities within the old Yugoslavia, a country
which normally would have been a welcome mem-
ber of these new instruments. These hostilities
came as a surprises to most people and forced
NATO to concentrate a great deal of its attention
on this new crisis, which we gradually realized was
becoming the main security challenge in the whole
of Europe.
This painful process has led to a number of
faits accomplis and has taught us a number of les-
sons. It has changed the relationship between the
UN and the regional organizations. It has forced
NATO to concentrate a lot of both attention and
material resources on the south-east of Europe.
To what degree is this to the detriment of the North
of Europe? Are the conflicts in former Yugosla-
via only local phenomena, or is peace in Europe
indivisible? I will try to analyze these and related
questions in the following pages. But first a quick
look at the present security situation in the Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden).
SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE NORTH
Denmark, Iceland and Norway are, as before,
members of NATO. Denmark has been a member
of the EU since 1972, now joined by Finland and
Sweden. These maintain a certain degree of neu-
trality, but in the present circumstances this idea
has little significance. In both countries there are
protagonists for NATO membership.
Incongruent as this group may be from a secu-
rity policy perspective, it continues to stick together
as a close group. They have started to cooperate
in new ways with neighbouring countries, especially
the former members of the Warsaw Pact. They
participate with all the eleven countries surround-
ing the Baltic Sea in a number of ways, culminat-
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ing in a prime ministers meeting in Visby, Swe-
den, in May 1996. This circle includes Russia and
is therefore seen as an important East-West link.
Within this circle, the Nordic Council and
its members have developed very close relations
with, and assistance programs for, the three Baltic
countries. This cooperation no doubt has security
policy overtones, and even includes some support
for the emerging Baltic military forces.
For Norway especially, the relationship with
Russia along a 200 km long land border and huge
sea borders is essential. The cold war relationship
has been replaced by livelyeconomic relations and
extensive programs of cooperation, especially in
the Barentz Sea region. Several other countries are
involved in this program. It requires considerable
resources to build up a program which can help
create a lasting good neighbourly relationship with
our superpower neighbour.
Norway and Denmark are maintaining their
old policyof having no foreign bases and no atomic
weapons on their territories. Self-imposed Norwe-
gian limitations on allied military exercises in the
areas bordering on Russia have recently been
somewhat relaxed. This very limited step met with
a disproportionately unfriendly response from the
Russian side, giving support to the fear that Rus-
sianmilitary leaders still see us as enemies and want
to have a buffer zone along their frontiers.
This brief reviewwill hopefully illustrate the
many preoccupations that the Nordic countries
have at home, and from which they approach the
emergencies in the South-East of Europe.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF THE BALKAN CRISIS
A lot of serious criticisms of the "interna-
tional community" have come both from within the
former Yugoslavia and from other quarters for its
attitude towards the war of wars in this area. Some
have even maintained that other countries have
betrayed the groups involved, and contrasts have
been made to the efficient international reaction
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Needless to say, there
isno comparison between a clear aggression across
an international border and an internal conflict
between ethnic groups.
It must be realized that there was no inter-
national machinery to deal with such crises. I think
it must be stated, as a point of departure, "that"
the responsibility for starting the war lies on the
shoulders of one or several of the groups in the
area. The rest of Europe was willing to help over-
come the conflict, but did not, at first, know what
to do, and did not expected the developments to
become so drastic.
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But when they had considered and agreed
on what should be done, both the European orga-
nizations and the UN did a great deal, both quan-
titatively and qualitatively, to help end the war and
overcome human suffering. The humanitarian aid
effort and the escorting of aid convoys was an im-
pressive effort by the world. It also cost the lives
of hundreds of young men from peaceful Euro-
pean countries.
Today, it may appear that the limited and
more action oriented organizations of Europe
should have taken over from the beginning. This
is, if I may say so, an "unhistorical" way of think-
ing. At that time, when we thought of peace-keep-
ing operations, we thought automatically of the
United Nations. From a Nordic point of view,neu-
tral Finland and Sweden could not imagine to take
part in any operations except under the UN um-
brella. Even the Scandinavian NATO members
were reserved in this respect, and had a cautious
view of any NATO role "out of the area". Again,
it was the force of events that made us change our
views, gradually realizing that a change from the
UN to NATO was a necessity. It was a view that
had to mature, and it did so over a historically very
brief time span.
The new role "out of area" which was cast
upon NATO came in parallel with new efforts and
experiences under NACC and Partnership for
Peace, as well as with the important process of
deciding on accepting new members. To what de-
gree has the peace implementation in the former
Yugoslavia affected these three processes? And,
in particular to what degree have they affected the
security position of the Northern members of
NATO? In general, NATO has managed admira-
bly well to carry on all these tasks in parallel. But
the need for attention to the northernmost mem-
ber, Norway, the only member having a common
border with the potential European superpower,
is still great. Exercise activities in the north have
been concentrated more than ever on Central and
South-Eastern Europe. Is this happening at our
expense? In certain situations, this would be so.
But, fortunately the NATO commitment to the
North is unchanged and we now have good and
cooperative neighbourhood relations with all our
neighbours.
This brings us to the questions whether
peace is indivisible,whether there can be real peace
in one part of Europe while there is war in an-
other. We see peace on the Eurasian continent as
indivisible and find it in our enlightened self-in-
terest to contribute to eliminate threats to peace
anywhere in Europe. Thus, we have found it quite
natural to do our share in the UNPROFOR and
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IFOR operations. We do so in a way which pro-
motes cooperation in the north. In IFOR we do it
in a way which even promotes a wider northern
cooperation. We have started cooperating alsowith
Poland, forming a Scandinavian-Polish Brigade. In
addition, contingents from Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania have been included in the Brigade, thus
also initiating military cooperation among the Bal-
tic countries.
PROSPECTS AND SOLUTIONS
Whatever the effects of the wars in the
former Yugoslavia, we have to look at the future
and ask: What will be and what do we want to be
the consequences of the present efforts for peace
in the area?
There is no hesitation in the Nordic coun-
tries in doing their best, with their extensive aid
and peace-keeping experience, to secure peace and
stability in the South-East of our common conti-
nent. The Nordic defence ministers have discussed
a prolongation of their troops in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after the present international force
and have agreed to take part in such a continued
effort, on a smaller scale than now.
I think this attitude is also reflected con-
cretely in the number of well known Nordic per-
sonalities having taken up important positions in
the peacemaking process. Some examples: Former
Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt is leading the
huge aid and reconstruction effort of the Euro-
pean Union. Former Finnish Defence Minister,
Ms. Elizabeth Rehn, has been given the task of
monitoring respect for human rights in the area.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg
completed his task as a UN mediator with forging
the agreement of a peace arrangement in Eastern
Slavonia, while his military advisor, former Su-
preme Commander of the Norwegian Army and
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Gen-
eral Vigleik Eide, was leading the disarmament
negotiations under the mandate of the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
Of course, in the main, it is up to the au-
thorities; the military and the peoples of the area
to shape their future. Will blind hatred prevail as
before? Will the decisive forces in the area be able
to find a way of enlightened self-interest, which
means compromise and reconciliation, or will the
desire to destroy neighbours of other ethnic ori-
gins prevail? These questions are not for me to
answer.
What is certain, is that the retreat of the UN
and the taking over of full responsibilities by
NATO and the European organizations will have
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a profound and lasting effect on the European se-
curity scene. If the task Ofpeace implementation
really leads to peace, it will be good for the former
war-torn areas as well as for a future peace coop-
eration in Europe, indeed, for the realization of
the concept and the reality of "common security"
in Europe.
From a northern perspective, it will be of
overriding importance to avoid a new east-west
confrontation in the south of Europe. The much
feared scenario of an unholy Russian-Serbian alli-
ance seems to me to be a rather far-fetched one.
Russia is now a partner in the peacekeeping op-
eration and in the wider strategic context. But, of
course, a sustained and conscious effort must be
made to prevent such a scenario from coming true.
The peacekeeping and reconstruction opera-
tion will have an impact both for each of the orga-
nizations involved, and for the relationships be-
tween them. Let us look at each of the main orga-
nizations and their tasks in turn.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
While debating its common foreign policy
and its role in defence and security, the European
Union has had to take stands and actions in the
Balkan crisis in ways which to a large extent have
set decisive precedents for the conclusions of the
debate. In this debate, the Nordic NATO coun-
tries have had their reservations as to the security
and defence role of the EU.
In relation to former Yugoslavia, the EU
took on an important political role under the pres-
sure of events. In the middle of the debate on the
relationship of the EU to the Western European
Union, the WEU took up operative tasks for. the
first time in supervising the embargo imposed by
the UN, byparticipating in the Adriatic Sea block-
ade, and on the Danube, with patrol boats, to con-
trol the blockade against Serbia there.
In the present phase, the EU has taken upon
itself the leadership in the assistance for recon-
struction of the devastated areas. This may be a
decisive factor in recreating peace. If peace can be
seen to lead to welfare and material progress,
through own efforts and foreign assistance, one
should think, as an outsider, that the necessary will
for peace will be strengthened. By setting political
conditions for the delivery of aid (especially to
Serbia) the EU also exercises a more specific po-
litical influence.
As we see it, it will be a condition for suc-
cess to combine physical reconstruction with the
construction or reconstruction of democratic in-
stitutions. We are aware that the old Yugoslavia
had developed traditions of workers self-manage-
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ment and municipal self-government. The new
republics which have gained independence have
built democratic structures, while in Bosnia-
Herzegovina war and other factors have prevented
such a development. If there is a wish for it, assis-
tance will be given also for the democratic con-
struction. But on the other hand, tendencies in
other directions will be watched closely. It is a re-
ality of today s international politics that internal
matters of countries are being scrutinized closely
by others. Democracy is a decisive criterion for
admission to European organizations and for state-
to-state cooperation programs.
The EU role in the south-east can also be
seen in the light of the discussion of the relative
emphasis of the Union on the North of the South.
There is a competition for resources between many
areas and programs.
In the framework of the Baltic cooperation,
ambitious programs are beingworked out and need
financing. But, at the same time, the EU will con-
tinue to pursue its programmes for the candidate
members of Central Europe and for the Mediter-
ranean countries, of which the former Yugoslav
republics are parts. There will be a continued need
for resources from Brussels for this area, in com-
petition with the resources sought from the north-
ern countries, especially for the Baltic Sea States
program.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO sees the crisis in former Yugoslavia
as the main security threat of today and has mobi-
lized unprecedented resource there. What contri-
bution to peace can the Organization make be-
yond the present peace-keeping phase? The man-
date for the present phase runs out in December.
Discussion are going on about the continuation.
Provided the first phase is successful, a lot of cre-
ativity will be needed to plan for the next. One of
the main concerns will and should be how to con-
tinue the all-European character of the effort, how
to keep Russia as a partner.
At the same time, the countries of the South
of Europe should gradually become partners of
NATO by participation in the NACC and the PfP.
The PfP includes joint exercises in such tasks as
how to overcome natural as well as man-made di-
sasters. It includes methods for establishing civil-
ian control over the military, a subject presumably
pertinent to the situation in the Balkan area.
It is, in my opinion, too early to start dis-
cussing the question of membership for the coun-
tries of former Yugoslavia, with the exception of
Slovenia. Each candidate for membership must
fulfil strict conditions concerning their democratic
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qualities. But not only that. NATO will not want
to adopt members which bring with them conflicts
with their neighbours.
The foundations for solving such conflicts
have been laid down in the Stability Pact, which
was signed by most European countries in 1995.
It requires that all partners to the Pact enter into
agreements with their neighbours to settle their
differences. This will, in practice, be a requirement
for membership in NATO. Hungary, for example,
has concluded such a treaty with Slovakia, and is
envisaging entering into similar treaty with
Belgrade, mainly about the treatment of Hungar-
ian minorities.
When will the countries of former Yugosla-
via be in a position to sign such treaties with each
other? The point here is that one country can block
the way for its neighbours. Even if one country
qualifies for membership as far as democratic cri-
teria are concerned, and even if it has the best of
intentions to settle conflicts with its neighbour, it
cannot do sowithout a minimum of goodwill from
that neighbour. Thus, one country can exercise
what is in practice a veto over the membership of
others. But this is for the future.
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)
This organization has a good name in the
North of Europe. We support fully its role in pre-
venting conflicts before they have broken out. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina it is fulfilling an essential
task - that of preparing and carrying out demo-
cratic elections.
Some countries, especially Russia, want to
strengthen this organization radically - even to
make it the main security organization in Europe,
perhaps even replacing NATO. Such thoughts find
little approval among the Northern countries. The
NATO members want to keep NATO as an an-
chor of peace.
The desire to have a specifically European
organization will be met to a large extent by the
present plans within NATO. These plans have the
aim to establish a military force, which maybe used
both byNATO and by the West European Union.
And it may be used also in joint operations with
countries not members of the Alliance. These de-
velopments again show, as I see it, an admirable
adaptability on the part of the North Atlantic Al-
liance - an adaptability which may also become of
great benefit to the countries in former Yugosla-
via in overcoming the effects of the tragic war. _
